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Mentioning the word "discrimination" to lawyers is kind of like
waving a red flag in front of a bull. It generally gets us in the mood to
sue somebody.
Our inclination is to say all discrimination should be rooted out.
After all, the Constitution promises the government will treat citizens
equally, without bias or prejudice.
The phrase "discrimination against religion" may make us think
of anti-mosque protests that have taken place in some cities and towns
across the nation, protests against the right of American Muslim
communities simply to locate or expand their worship facilities. In cases
like these, there can be no doubt that we must use the Constitution and
anti-discrimination laws as tools to protect the equal right to religious
liberty, one of our nation's most important promises.2 The government
certainly should not engage in invidious discrimination against religion
in general or against particular faiths.
When we talk about discrimination, we also think of the long and
distinguished American civil rights tradition, one that has produced a
constellation of laws prohibiting a variety of forms of discrimination by
*Melissa Rogers serves as director of the Center for Religion and Public
Affairs at Wake Forest University Divinity School and as a nonresident senior fellow
in the Governance Studies program of The Brookings Institution. Rogers previously
served as the executive director of the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life and
as general counsel of the Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty.
1. See Map-Nationwide Anti-Mosque Activity, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org
/map-nationwide-anti-mosque-activity (last visited Jan. 29, 2012); Controversies
over Mosques and Islamic Centers Across the U.S., PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND
PUBLiC LIFE, (Sept. 29, 2010), http://features.pewforum.org/muslim/controversies-
over-mosque-and-islamic-centers-across-the-us.html.
2. Melissa Rogers, A Seamless System of Religious Freedom, 38 PERSP. IN
RELIGIOUS STUD. 169 (Summer 2011); Eric Treene, RLUIPA and Mosques:
Enforcing a Fundamental Right in Challenging Times, 10 FIRST AMENDMENT L.
REv. 330 (Winter 2012).
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governmental as well as certain nongovernmental entities in
employment, housing, and other contexts. Many religious leaders have
played, and are playing, key roles in this civil rights tradition. Indeed,
when the 1964 Civil Rights Act was enacted, President Lyndon B.
Johnson reportedly said it "could not have been passed without the
backing it received from the churches and synagogues."' These laws
have helped to make our nation more just, open, and strong.
At the same time, once we look more closely at the terms
"discrimination" and "religion," we begin to see some complexity. While
it would be profoundly disturbing for a commercial business or secular
nonprofit to prefer Jewish applicants for employment over Christian
applicants, it is a different story when a Jewish synagogue prefers a rabbi
over a Baptist preacher.4 We understand the value of religious
communities being able to define themselves by their religious identities,
beliefs, and practices.
For the same reasons, we respect the right of the Catholic Church
to exclude women from its priesthood, even as many disagree with that
stance and some within the faith seek to change it. If the government
were to prohibit discrimination in cases like these, it would effectively
deny religious communities' abilities to define themselves and pursue
their missions.
So, the truth is religious freedom sometimes requires the
freedom to discriminate. Policymakers have often recognized this fact by
creating special exemptions for religious entities from general non-
discrimination laws.'
Nonetheless, there are serious debates in related cases, cases
pitting anti-discrimination against religious freedom. Should a faith-
based adoption agency that is licensed by the state be permitted to refuse
3. See generally Melissa Rogers, Religious Advocacy by American Religious
Institutions: A History, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES, (Derek H. Davis, ed., 2010).
4. See generally Melissa Rogers, Federal Funding and Religion-based
Employment Decisions, in SANCTIONING RELIGION? POLITIcs, LAW, AND FAITH-
BASED PUBLIC SERVICES (David K. Ryden & Jeffrey Polet, eds., 2005).
5. See generally Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from
Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781 (2007).
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to place children in need of adoption with same-sex couples? 6 Should a
religious social service ministry that receives a government grant for its
secular work be allowed to place a religious test on government-funded
jobs?' And should religious communities be able to make employment
decisions regarding their ministers for any reason, regardless of what
anti-discrimination laws might say? What kinds of discrimination by
religious groups should the government refuse to tolerate, much less
accommodate?
There is also more complexity than initially meets the eye on the
other side of the coin we are considering today: discrimination by the
government against religion. While the Constitution prohibits
governmental discrimination against religion, the First Amendment says
the government must sometimes treat religion differently.
Although public school teachers can engage their students in a
variety of learning exercises, they cannot lead their classes in prayers.9 A
state can make a grant to a faith-based organization to implement a
substance abuse program that uses nonreligious materials and instruction.
But it may not allow such an organization to use those funds to subsidize
a course that utilizes devotional materials and includes religious
instruction. The government cannot promote or sponsor religious
exercises and messages, and it cannot permit direct aid to underwrite or
support religious activities. o At times the government must-and at
other times it may-treat religion differently.
But today some argue this kind of different treatment-far from
being required or even permitted by the Constitution-is actually
forbidden by it because this treatment constitutes pernicious
discrimination against religion."
6. See generally Colleen Theresa Rutledge, Caught in the Crossfire: How
Catholic Charities of Boston was Victim to the Clash Between Gay Rights and
Religious Freedom, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 297 (2008).
7. See generally Rogers, supra note 4.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see also Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
10. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
11. See, e.g., Doe v. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); see generally ALLIANCE DEFENSE FUND, http://www.alliancedefense
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This morning I'd like to address these topics-discrimination by
and against religion-by exploring three questions:
First, what are some ways in which the U.S. Supreme Court has
distinguished between discrimination against religion, which the
Constitution forbids, and different treatment of religion, which the
Constitution sometimes requires or permits?
Second, part of this different treatment involves the government
in staying its hand in ways that would not be required if nonreligious
beliefs, practices, and organizations were involved. One example is
sometimes the government must, and other times it may, refrain from
applying aspects of anti-discrimination laws and regulations to religious
bodies. What are some of the ways in which the Court has grappled with
discrimination by religious bodies in the specific context of
employment?
Finally, I would like to weave into these two discussions a
consideration of how these lines are being tested and challenged today,
both on and off the Court. Do these challenges have merit, or do the
basic lines the Court has drawn on discrimination by and against religion
make some sense and fit together in some way? Here, I will argue that
many of these lines, while imperfect, do make sense and fit together for a
larger purpose. That larger purpose is protecting the freedom of
conscience and the autonomy of faith, both of which are indispensible
elements of authentic religious freedom.
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RELIGION
The Constitution does not permit the government to discriminate
against religion, meaning to subject faith to biased or prejudicial
treatment.
fund.org/ReligiousFreedom (last visited Feb. 18, 2012). For scholarly articulations
of this approach regarding funding, see, e.g., Stanley Carlson-Thies, Implementing
the Faith-Based Initiative, 155 THE PUB. INT. 57 (Spring 2004)
http://www.cpjustice.org/files/SCTImpltheFBI.pdf; Stanley Carlson-Thies, Dir. of
Soc. Pol'y, The Center for Public Justice, Kuyper Lecture: Keeping Faith in the
Faith-Based Initiative: From Formal Neutrality to Full Pluralism in Government
Partnerships with Faith-Based Social Services, http://www.cpjustice.org/files/
2005KuyperLecture 1.pdf.
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The Supreme Court has made it clear that the Free Exercise
Clause bars the government from "impos[ing] special disabilities on the
basis of religious views or religious status.',12 "At a minimum," the Court
has said, "the protections of the Free Exercise Clause [are relevant] if [a
law] discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons."
One instance where the Court made good on the latter promise
was a case it decided in 1993, Church of the Lukumi against the City of
Hialeah, Florida.14 The City of Hialeah had passed an ordinance
permitting animal slaughter for the purposes of consuming the animals
but prohibiting animal sacrifice, the ritual slaughter of animals for a
religious reason.' 5 This threatened an important practice of the Santeria
faith, and it was anything but accidental.16 Justice Kennedy noted that
"the minutes and taped excerpts of [a city council session] evidence[d]
significant hostility . . . toward the Santeria religion and its practice of
animal sacrifice." 7 Indeed, the Court said the evidence revealed that the
ordinances "had as their object the suppression of religion." 8 Thus, these
ordinances violated the Free Exercise Clause. Here, we can clearly see
that this Clause prohibits the government from discriminating against
religion.
But what about the First Amendment's Establishment Clause?
Doesn't the Establishment Clause require, or at least permit, the
government to discriminate against religion, some ask? No. This is a
common understanding of the Establishment Clause, but it is a
misunderstanding. One of the oldest Establishment Clause tests says
governmental actions are unconstitutional if they have the "primary
effect" of either advancing or inhibiting faith. 1 In its analysis of
Establishment Clause issues, the Court has emphasized that, "The First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and
12. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
13. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
532 (1993).
14. Id. at 520.
15. Id. at 526.
16. Id. at 534.
17. Id. at 541 (Kennedy and Stevens, JJ.).
18. Id. at 542.
19. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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religion, and between religion and nonreligion."20 The Supreme Court
has repeatedly said the Constitution, including the Establishment Clause,
21
does not countenance hostility toward faith.
So, the Establishment Clause does not allow the government to
treat religion poorly. But it does sometime require, and at other times
permit, the government to treat religion differently. For example, the
state cannot take actions that tend to establish religion, and the Court has
said that means the government cannot promote or sponsor religion.2 To
avoid those dangers, the state must treat religion differently. Here, being
discriminating means recognizing legitimate differences and treating
them differently.
When do those dangers-governmental promotion or
sponsorship of religion-actually exist? That question hits on a complex
and heated debate, one running across myriad issues involving religious
expression and government sponsorship as well as government financial
aid and faith-based entities and activities. I would like to touch on the
latter topic.
In the past, the Court has set forth a variety of restrictions here;
restrictions it said were necessary to ensure the government did not run
afoul of the Establishment Clause's bar on governmental subsidies for or
advancement of religion.23 The Court considered this kind of different
treatment to be the benign form of discrimination required by the
Establishment Clause rather than the kind of pernicious discrimination
prohibited by the Constitution.24 Increasingly, however, many of these
20. Eppefson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
21. See, e.g., Beyond the Pledge of Allegiance: Hostility to Religious
Expression in the Public Square: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 108th
Cong. 43 (2004) (statement of Melissa Rogers, Professor, Wake Forest University
Divinity School), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.
cfm?id=4fl e0899533f7680e78d03281 ffa7581&wit-id=4fl e0899533f7680e78d0328
Iffa7581-3-2.
22. Id.
23. See generally RONALD B. FLOWERS, MELISSA ROGERS & STEVEN K.
GREEN, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE SUPREME COURT 385-565 (2008); KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS
352-85 (2008).
24. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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limits are being challenged as forms of invidious discrimination. Some of
these challenges are coming from members of the Supreme Court.
One such challenge arose in a case the Court decided in 2000,
25
Mitchell v. Helms. In this case, the Court confronted a longstanding
school aid program whereby the federal government distributed funds to
state and local governments, which in turn purchased educational
materials and equipment and lent them to public and private schools,
including private religious schools.26 A group of taxpayers filed suit,
saying the program, as applied in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, violated
27
the Establishment Clause. The program provided direct aid to religious
elementary and secondary schools, and this aid had the primary effect of
211
advancing religion, they said.
The Court held that the program did not violate the First
Amendment, but a Court plurality went further.29 The plurality said the
exclusion of religious schools from this program "would raise serious
questions under the Free Exercise Clause," citing the Lukumi case's
prohibition against governmental "discriminat[ion] against some or all
religious beliefs."30 Given trends in Establishment Clause interpretation,
it was not so surprising that the Court upheld the program. It was
somewhat surprising, however, to hear four members of the Court say
the inclusion of religious schools in the program might be not only
constitutionally permissible but also constitutionally required. Likewise,
the plurality broke new ground with a declaration regarding attempts by
government to exclude organizations from eligibility for funding
programs due to the fact that the entities are pervasively religious. This
approach was not only unnecessary but also discriminatory, the plurality
said."
25. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
26. Id. at 802-03.
27. Id. at 803-04.
28. Id.
29. Id at 835.
30. Id. at 835 n.19.
31. Id. at 826-29. In this section of the plurality opinion, Justice Thomas
wrote:
[T]he religious nature of a recipient should not matter to the
constitutional analysis, so long as the recipient adequately
furthers the government's secular purposes. . ..
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[T]he application of the "pervasively sectarian" factor collides
with our decisions that have prohibited governments from
discriminating in the distribution of public benefits based upon
religious status or sincerity....
[Nlothing in the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion
of pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible
aid programs, and other doctrines of this Court bar it. This
doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now.
Id. at 827-29. I have my own criticisms of certain forms of the "pervasively
sectarian test," and I certainly condemn anti-Catholic bigotry and all other forms of
anti-religious bigotry, past and present. See Melissa Rogers & E.J. Dionne, Jr.,
Serving People in Need, Safeguarding Religious Freedom: Recommendations for the
New Administration on Partnerships with Faith-Based Organizations, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION (2008), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/fliles/rc/papers/2008/
12_religion dionne/12_religion dionne.pdf. As Professor Alan Brownstein has said,
"There is no denying the role that anti-Catholic sentiments played in the American
polity's support for the common school and its resistance to the public funding of
religious schools." Alan E. Brownstein, The Souter's Dissent: Correct but
Inadequate, in CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN CRISIS 151, 166-67 (Stephen V.
Monsma, ed., 2002). However, the plurality's suggestion that all separationist
concerns in this area can be explained by anti-Catholic bigotry is far off the mark.
Professor Brownstein explains:
[T]he birth of the American commitment to the separation of
church and state on which the principle requiring the rejection
of aid to religious schools is based occurred far earlier than
1850 in a context divorced from the nativist attitudes that
Thomas rightly condemns. . . . The later co-option of the no-
aid principle cannot tarnish its true source as a part of the
struggle for religious liberty and tolerance....
No clearer example of this reality is the principle of states'
right, a constitutional concept to which [Justice] Thomas
himself is unabashedly and enthusiastically committed. Yet
surely no constitutional doctrine has been tainted more
severely than this one by its association with racial intolerance
and the cruelest and crudest forms of bigotry. .. .
It makes no more sense to reject the separation of church and
state or to impugn the motives of those who support that
doctrine today because of its earlier identification with anti-
Catholic sentiments than it does to insist that federalism and
current supporters of states' rights are forever tarnished
because of the racist abuses that doctrine was so often invoked
to protect.
Id. at 167-68 (footnotes omitted).
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Another surprise was the plurality's judgment that the use of
direct aid for explicitly religious activities did not offend the
32Establishment Clause. To be sure, Justice Thomas conceded that the
Court had "seen 'special Establishment Clause dangers,' when money is
given to religious schools or entities directly rather than... indirectly,"
while noting that direct money payments were not at issue in the case.
In an accompanying footnote, however, Thomas hinted that cases
involving such payments did not necessarily raise constitutional flags. 34
And the basic rule the plurality set forth would certainly allow religious
groups to use direct money payments for religious items and activities.3 5
32. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801-36.
33. Id. at 818-19 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995)).
34. Justice Thomas wrote:
It is arguable . .. at least after Witters v. Washington Dept. of
Servs. for Blind, that the principles of neutrality and private
choice would be adequate to address [the "special risks"
presented by direct money payments], for it is hard to see the
basis for deciding Witters differently simply if the State had
sent the tuition check directly to whichever school Witters
chose to attend.
Id. at 819 n.8.
35. In the opinion he wrote for the plurality in Mitchell, Justice Thomas said:
If the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible
for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any
indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been
done at the behest of the government. For attribution of
indoctrination is a relative question. If the government is
offering assistance to recipients who provide, so to speak, a
broad range of indoctrination, the government itself is not
thought responsible for any particular indoctrination. To put
the point differently, if the government, seeking to further
some legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms,
without regard to religion, to all who adequately further that
purpose, [citation omitted] then it is fair to say that any aid
going to a religious recipient only has the effect of furthering
that secular purpose. The government, in crafting such an aid
program, has had to conclude that a given level of aid is
necessary to further that purpose among secular recipients and
has provided no more than that same level to religious
recipients.
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If the government has a secular purpose for distributing aid, and if the aid
is made broadly available to religious and nonreligious entities alike,
then the government would not be responsible for whatever the
organizations did to further that secular purpose, the plurality said.
So, assume the government funds programs aimed at conquering
drug addiction and a religious group believes reading the Bible and
accepting Jesus Christ as one's personal savior are the only ways for a
drug addict to accomplish that end. Under the plurality's rule,
presumably the government could give a grant to this religious group as
well as nonreligious groups for their programs, and the faith-based group
could use those funds to buy Bibles and pay for religious instruction.
In her opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor flagged the plurality's approach as foreshadowing a radical
break with precedent.3 "Although 'our cases have permitted some
government funding of secular functions performed by sectarian
organizations,' our decisions 'provide no precedent for the use of public
funds to finance religious activities,"' she warned.
Id. at 809-10.
36. See id. at 826-29.
37. Id. at 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he plurality opinion
foreshadows the approval of direct monetary subsidies to religious organizations,
even when they use the money to advance their religious objectives."). Justice
O'Connor explained:
[T]here is no reason that, under the plurality's reasoning, the
government should be precluded from providing direct money
payments to religious organizations (including churches) based
on the number of persons belonging to each organization. And,
because actual diversion is permissible under the plurality's
holding, the participating religious organizations (including
churches) could use that aid to support religious indoctrination.
To be sure, the plurality does not actually hold that its theory
extends to direct money payments. That omission, however, is
of little comfort. In its logic-as well as its specific advisory
language,-the plurality opinion foreshadows the approval of
direct monetary subsidies to religious organizations, even
when they use the money to advance their religious objectives.
Id. at 843-44.
38. Id. at 840 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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Now Justice O'Connor has retired and Justice Samuel Alito has
replaced her on the bench. So, some of the questions on the table are: Is
it possible for a governmental body to exclude religious entities from
particular aid programs, or do all such exclusions necessarily constitute
hostility toward faith? May the government deny organizations certain
forms of aid because these organizations cannot separate secular from
religious activities, or are all such denials based in bigotry, and thus
invalid? Is a general bar on the use of direct aid, including direct money
payments, for religious activities essential or unessential to our system of
religious freedom?
My view is that excluding religious entities, or certain kinds of
religious entities, from particular aid programs is not necessarily
discriminatory,39 and the bar on the use of direct subsidies for religious
activities is indispensible. Let me explain.
As you know, many religious dissenters protested against state
financial support for churches and religion in the founding era.40 These
dissenters believed government support for religion violated the rights of
conscience and turned faith into a creature of the state.41 It would come
as a surprise to them, I think, that the only possible motivation for such
positions would be disfavor for or suppression of religious ideas, and that
a bar on the use of government funds for religious items, messages, and
activities was unnecessary.
To be sure, the programs these religious dissenters confronted
were different than the ones at issue today. They usually involved
preferential aid for one or more favored churches-not all religious
entities were equally eligible, and nonreligious entities were mostly
ineligible. And the primary aim of these programs was to promote
religion, not some secular goal, although encouraging good behavior and
order through religious adherence and instruction was usually part of the
mix. But many religious dissenters did not confine their objections to
these narrow outlines. Instead, they broadly asserted the state had no
39. For an important article exploring these and related issues, see Nelson
Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263 (2008).
40. See generally Melissa Rogers, Traditions of Church-State Separation:
Some Ways They Have Protected Religion and Advanced Religious Freedom and
How They Are Threatened Today, 18 J.L. & POL., 280-94 (2002).
41. Id.
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business funding and regulating churches and otherwise collecting
money from citizens that would then be used for religious purposes and
activities-it was a going entirely out of the state's jurisdiction, they
said.42
James Madison echoed this sentiment. In his Memorial and
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, Madison said: "The
Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience
of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may
dictate." 43 When the government becomes involved in subsidizing
religion, it violates the consciences of taxpayers, Madison argued.4 The
government should not force a citizen to contribute even "three pence"
for "the support of any one establishment. . . "4
These religious Americans believed religion was different, and
the government must sometimes treat religion differently. Their motives
were not hostility toward faith but rather hostility toward government
intrusion in this sacred realm. The nature and reach of government
funding programs have changed significantly since the late eighteenth
century. Nonetheless, many of the concerns these Americans raised
remain valid today.
For example, today we may think most people will not be
troubled by government funding of faith if it occurs in the context of a
broad program with a secular purpose, one in which organizations of all
faiths and none may seek state money. However, polling indicates that,
even with regard to programs like these, levels of comfort for
government involvement with religion fluctuate depending on the
42. Id.
43. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS 5 (1819).
44. Id
45. Id. at 7.
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specific faith involved.46 Elected leaders pay attention to these things,
and that spells constitutional trouble.47
Further, subsidizing religious messages with government funds
changed those messages in the eighteenth century, and it will change
48
them today. When state funds are used to pay for messages and
activities, the state will regulate those messages and activities, even if
they are religious. The government will welcome some religious
teachings and be wary of others. Allowing the state to sift through and
censor religious messages will warp them. Likewise, the government will
attempt to use the control it gains over religion to ensure that
communities of faith are supplicants to the state rather than its prophetic
critics.
Another danger of demanding equal access to government aid
for religious institutions is that it will result in equal regulation of those
institutions, even ones that do not receive government funds. This would
end the special exemptions religious bodies often enjoy under the law.49
As Professor Alan Brownstein has explained, the theory espoused by the
Mitchell v. Helms plurality undercuts the case for religious exemptions.
The plurality "demands that religious institutions must be considered
fungible alternatives of secular institutions, not uniquely distinct
organizations that require special consideration," Brownstein notes.o "If
this is the rule for distribution of state subsidies, it is hard to understand
46. See, e.g., Faith-Based Funding Backed, But Church-State Doubts Abound,
PEw RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS AND PEW FORUM (April 10,
2001), http://www.people-press.org/2001/04/1 0/faith-based-ffunding-backed-but-
church-state-doubts-abound/.
47. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("The First Amendment
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between
religion and nonreligion.").
48. Rogers, supra note 40, at 280-94.
49. See Brownstein, supra note 31, at 157. See also Walter Dellinger, Former
Soclicitor General, Comments at the 2011 National Lawyers Convention, The
Ministerial Exception Case: Hosanna-Tabor Church & School v. EEOC (Nov. 11,
2011), http://www.fed-soc.org/events/page/20 1-national-lawyers-convention-
schedule (suggesting that religious entities should be included in broad-based
government funding programs and, partially because of that equal treatment,
religious bodies should also be treated more equally on the other side of the coin-
they should be afforded fewer special exemptions from governmental regulation).
50. Brownstein, supra note 31, at 157.
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why equality of treatment should not also be the rule for the application
of state regulations." 5' It is already difficult to convince policymakers
that religious exemptions from general laws and regulations are needed
and appropriate. Adoption of an equal access to funding rule would make
that task much more challenging.
The government may and sometimes must decline to fund
certain religious activities, and it may and sometimes must exclude
52
certain religious entities from particular funding schemes. Treating
religion differently is not necessarily invidious discrimination.5 3 Instead,
it is often an attempt by government to avoid supporting and regulating
religion, picking and choosing among faiths, warping and weakening
religious messages, and creating a corrosive dependence of religion on
government.
5 1. Id.
52. For example, I believe a governmental body should have the latitude to
decide that social service grants should not be extended to houses of worship (even
as it extends grants to other religious organizations) in order to effectuate a healthy
separation between the institutions of church and state, including the preservation of
the special exemptions churches often enjoy. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL
ON FAITH AND NEIGHBORHOOD PARTNERSHIPS: REPORT AND RECCOMMENDATIONS
TO THE PRESIDENT 22 (2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
microsites/ofbnp-council-final-report.pdf. Such. a restriction would stem from
benevolence toward faith, not hostility.
53. In my view, the government impermissibly discriminates against religion
when it excludes religious organizations from an expressive forum that grants equal
access to government property for community organizations. See Melissa Rogers,
The Texas Religious Viewpoints Antidiscrimination Act and the Establishment
Clause, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 939, 993-98 (2009). These equal access speech
programs are significantly different from government funding programs. See Locke
v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 n.3 (2004) (recognizing scholarship aid program is not
a forum for speech and thus "cases dealing with speech forums are simply
inapplicable"); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995) ("When the government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a
governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its
message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee."); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173 (1991).
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DISCRIMINATION BY RELIGION
Limiting the types of benefits that flow to religious activities or
institutions is not the only way the Supreme Court has said the
government must or may treat religion differently. The Constitution also
requires and sometimes permits the government to stay its regulatory
hand in some ways that would not be required if nonreligious beliefs,
practices, and organizations were involved.
This forbearance is evident in certain anti-discrimination laws
and regulations governing the workplace. Legislative bodies often
exempt religious entities from these laws and regulations, allowing them
to be free of government oversight unlike their secular counterparts.54
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided a case involving an
exemption for religious organizations from a non-discrimination law, the
1964 Civil Rights Act. The case is known as Presiding Bishop v. Amos.55
The facts of the case involved a building engineer who worked at
a gymnasium owned by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
(LDS). The LDS church fired the engineer after more than a decade of
service because he did not qualify for a "temple recommend," a
certificate demonstrating he was a bona fide member of the church and
thus eligible to attend LDS temples.57 Temple recommends "are issued
only to individuals who observe the Church's standards in such matters
as regular church attendance, tithing, and abstinence from coffee, tea,
alcohol, and tobacco." 8
The engineer argued that, to the extent that Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act allowed the LDS church to fire him for this reason, it
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.5 9 Although
he worked for a religious body, his job was nonreligious, he said, so he
should be covered by nondiscrimination guarantees.60 Title VII is the
54. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil
Rights Laws? 48 B. C. L. REV. 781 (2007).
55. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
56. Id. at 330.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 330 n.4.
59. Id. at 331.
60. Id. at 332.
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equal employment opportunity title of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 61it
applies to employers with fifteen or more employees in an industry
affecting interstate commerce62 and bars them from discriminating in
employment on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."63
However, Title VII exempts religious organizations from its ban
on religious discrimination in employment. 4 As signed into law in 1964,
the Act contained an exemption from its religious nondiscrimination
requirements for positions engaged in the religious activities of the
organization. 65 In 1972, Congress expanded this exemption to allow
religious organizations to hire on the basis of religion in all employee
positions.66
In the Amos case, the Court rejected the engineer's argument that
this broad exemption violated the Establishment Clause.67 This was the
correct conclusion. As the Court said, the exemption had a genuine
secular purpose.68 It would be a "significant burden" for religious
organizations to have to predict which of their jobs a court would find to
be engaged in religious activities and which were not.69 The exemption
spared a religious organization this concern, thus freeing it to define and
advance its mission as it saw fit, rather than as the government saw fit.70
Further, as the Court noted, the exemption did not have the forbidden
primary effect of advancing faith.71 The Court observed: "A law is not
unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion,
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e etseq. (2010).
62. Id. at § 2000e(b) (defining an "employer" as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees").
63. Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(2).
64. Id. at § 2000e-l(a).
65. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. (78 Stat.
241) (stating that the exemption did not apply to job positions "connected with the
carrying on by such [religious] corporation[s], association[s] or societ[ies] of [their]
religious activities").
66. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, sec. 3, §
702, 86 Stat. 103, 104 (1972).
67. Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987).
68. Id. at 332.
69. Id. at 336.
70. Id. at 335.
71. Id. at 337.
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which is their very purpose. For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under
Lemon [v. Kurtzman], it must be fair to say that the government itself has
advanced religion through its own activities and influence."72 The Court
declined, however, to consider whether the Constitution mandated the
Title VII exemption. 3 "We have no occasion to pass on the argument
. . . . that the exemption to which [the religious organization was] entitled
under § 702 is required by the Free Exercise Clause," it said. 74
A hot topic today is a matter the Court did not decide in the
Amos case: whether religious organizations may discriminate on the
basis of religion with regard to government-funded jobs, not jobs the
organization funds with its own money. The LDS organization involved
in Amos did not receive financial assistance from the state, so the Court
did not speak to that issue.75
Why is this a hot topic? This issue became a cause c61ebre when
former President George W. Bush instituted his faith-based initiative, but
it predates the Bush administration. Several laws were enacted in the mid
to late 1990s addressing the rules governing partnerships between
religious organizations and the government to provide federally funded
social services. These measures are known as "charitable choice"
provisions, and they were first championed by then-Senator John
Ashcroft.76
Such partnerships had been going on quietly for decades, but
charitable choice sought to accelerate and expand a relaxation of certain
church-state rules regarding government funding. There were some
noncontroversial aspects of charitable choice, such as allowing a
religious group to keep a religious name.77 As my friend John Dilulio has
said, the St. Vincent de Paul Center should not have to change its name
to the "Mr. Vincent de Paul Center" simply because it receives some
78government money.
72. Id
73. Id. at 339 n.17.
74. Id.
75. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 112-13.
76. See Rogers & Dionne, supra note 31, at 15.
77. Id.
78. David Morgan, Bush Faith-Based Plan Bigger Than Religion-Advisor,
REUTERS NEWS (April 1, 2001, 11:19 AM), http://wwm.org/articles/9625/
?&section=legislation.
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But there were also some controversial aspects of charitable
choice, none more so than the provision promising religious groups they
would be able to place religious tests on government-funded jobs. The
various sides of the debate cannot agree about what the state of actual
practice in this area was before charitable choice. Nonetheless, I believe
it can be safely said that, at least as a matter of federal law, before
charitable choice there was no affirmative statement allowing religious
groups to engage in such discrimination with government funds, but
there were a number of affirmative statements disallowing this kind of
discrimination, including some longstanding laws and civil rights
regulations. When President George W. Bush came into office, however,
he said religious organizations must have the ability to make religion-
based decisions regarding government-funded jobs and extended this
policy widely. When he was on the campaign trail, then-candidate
Obama promised to change this practice, but he has not done so yet.
My view is that it is unfair to exclude citizens from eligibility for
jobs their tax money subsidizes based simply on their faith or lack
thereof. Denying taxpayers the ability to compete for these jobs based
solely on the fact that they are not the "right" religion is a serious
injustice. When direct aid is involved, this policy is also arguably
unconstitutional. By directly subsidizing these positions and allowing
religious groups to place religious tests on them, the government could
be said to be subsidizing and promoting religion.80
In sum, I believe the subsidization of jobs with direct
government aid is a legitimate reason for prohibiting discrimination by
religious groups in those jobs. When religious groups accept government
grants for their work, they must agree to abide by certain regulations, and
this is reasonable and necessary restriction on such aid.
Let me conclude, however, by mentioning a few factors I do not
believe are legitimate reasons for disallowing certain forms of
79. See Rogers & Dionne, supra note 31, at 5, 9-10, 20.
80. See Faith-Based Initiatives: Recommendations of the President's Advisory
Council on Faith-Based and Community Partnerships and Other Current Issues:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 19-21 (2010) (statement of Melissa
Rogers, Director, Center for Religion and Public Affairs, Wake Forest University
Divinity School; Nonresident Senior Fellow, the Brookings Institution) available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Rogers101118.pdf
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discrimination by religious organizations. These factors have surfaced in
a case currently pending before the Supreme Court, Hosanna- Tabor
Church & School v. EEOC.8 1
The Hosanna-Tabor case involves a former teacher at a Lutheran
elementary and secondary school in Redford, Michigan.82 The former
teacher, Cheryl Perich, was a "called" teacher or a "commissioned
minister," meaning she had completed a theological course of study and
had been called by the Hosanna-Tabor congregation to teach at the
affiliated school. Perich taught fourth-grade students a range of
subjects, including math, social studies, music and religion, and she
regularly led students in prayer, worship services, and other devotional
activities.84 In June of 2004, Perich became ill and had to take a leave of
absence. She was eventually diagnosed with narcolepsy.86 Later that
year, Perich became involved in a dispute with the school about her
87
return to teaching, and she was ultimately dismissed. Perich filed a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), claiming the school's actions against her violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and Perich and the EEOC subsequently
sued the school.88
81. Please note that this address was delivered prior to the U.S. Supreme
Court's issuance of a decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
Sch. v. EEOC on January II, 2012. See Hlosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, _ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
82. For a helpful summary of the case, see Ira C. Lupu, David Masci, & Robert
W. Tuttle, In Brief The Supreme Court Takes Up Church Employment Disputes and




83. Hosanna-Tabor, _ U.S. _ 132 S. Ct. at 699-700.
84. Id. at , 132 S. Ct. at 700.
85. Id. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 700.
86. Id. at 132 S. Ct. at 700.
87. Id. at , 132 S. Ct. at 700.
88. Id. at , 132 S. Ct. at 700. For a much fuller treatment of the facts of this
case, see Mark Chopko & Marissa Parker, A Threshold Question: Exploring and
Refining the Ministerial Exception Within the Prism of Religious Institutional Rights,
10 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REv. 233 (Winter 2012).
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The school claims the teacher is a minister and thus the courts
are barred from reviewing this matter.89 It relies on a doctrine known as
the "ministerial exception." 90 The school says Perich was dismissed not
because of her disability but due to her refusal to follow the
organization's internal dispute resolution process, a process rooted in
Lutheran theology.
Mark Chopko provides a helpful definition of the ministerial
exception: "the doctrine, rooted in constitutional law, that those who
occupy positions of ministry in faith communities may be employed,
disciplined, and terminated according to the internal practices of those
communities and may not contest these employment decisions through
the secular courts." 92 The ministerial exception removes the employment
relationship of ministers and religious communities from government
regulation and oversight, including non-discrimination laws that might
be otherwise applicable. The purpose of the exception is to protect the
autonomy of religious communities. It has been widely recognized by the
lower courts, but now the Supreme Court has been asked to speak to it
directly for the first time.93
In the Hosanna-Tabor case, it has been suggested by the
Solicitor General of the United States, who serves as the attorney for the
EEOC, and the lawyer for the dismissed teacher, Cheryl Perich, that the
school has essentially given up its right to claim any special protections
the ministerial exception might provide because of several facts. 94 The
school exists in the public sphere and provides what the government
describes as a substitute for compulsory public education. And the school
is subject to state law on certain matters, such as compulsory attendance
laws as well as some curriculum and teacher certification requirements.95
89. Hosanna-Tabor, _ U.S. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 700.
90. Id. at , 132 S. Ct. at 700.
91. Id. at , 132 S. Ct. at 700.
92. Mark Chopko & Marissa Parker, supra note 88 at 234.
93. See id. at 235.
94. See Brief for the Federal Respondent at 52-53, Hosanna-Tabor, _ U.S.
132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553); Brief for Respondent Cheryl Perich at 27-37, 45-
51, Hosanna-Tabor, _ U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553); Transcript of Oral
Argument at 3, Hosanna-Tabor, U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553).
95. Brief for Respondent at 37, Hosanna-Tabor, _ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 694
(No. 10-553).
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In her brief, for example, Perich argues: "Religious organizations that
extend their operations beyond worship and spreading the faith into the
secular, commercial realm must abide by neutral rules that apply to all
such enterprises, . . . including anti-discrimination laws." 96
In my judgment, these facts do not justify refusing to allow a
religious organization full freedom to make employment decisions
regarding its ministers. The Constitution does not give the government
the power to interfere with religion simply because it is expressed in the
public sphere; because some of its activities can be seen by the
government as a substitute for certain public services; or because the
entity abides by some generally applicable laws and regulations. If this
approach were to rule the day, it could mean that many, if not most,
religious congregations could not claim the benefits of the ministerial
exception.
For example, congregations often operate feeding ministries that
are open to the public and to people of all faiths and none. A government
employee may see those ministries as a kind of substitute for a service
the state provides. The ministry may also be bound by certain generally
applicable regulations regarding feeding programs. Does that mean the
congregation or the feeding ministry, or both, should not be able to claim
the benefit of the ministerial exemption? My answer to this question is an
emphatic "no."
Further, this approach plays right into the hands of those who
would argue, falsely, that the Constitution kicks religion out of public
life. The Constitution prohibits the government from promoting or
sponsoring religion, but it protects the rights of religious individuals and
groups to promote their faith as they see fit in the public square,
including on government property. 97 The approach the Solicitor General
and Perich take, however, seems to punish religious organizations for
having the temerity to operate in public.
But it goes further than that, because this approach would seem
to deny a religious organization virtually any way to engage with its
96. Id. (citation omitted).
97. Religious Expression in American Public Life: A Joint Statement of
Current Law, CENTER FOR RELIGION AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, WAKE FOREST
UNIVERSITY DIVINITY SCHOOL (January 2010), http://divinity.wfu.edu/religion-and-
public-affairs/.
230 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 10
20121 TREATING RELIGION DIFFERENTLY
ministers free from the long arm of the law. What existing organization,
including what religious organization, operates today without being
regulated to some extent by government? While most religious
organizations do refuse government grants and thus avoid the specific
regulatory conditions attached to such grants, they simply cannot help
being regulated by the state to a degree. If the Solicitor General's
position were accepted, most churches might have no practical way to
claim the protections of the ministerial exception-that regulation could
be enough to justify the government in denying a religious organization
the protections of the ministerial exemption. The religious body that
wants to have autonomy regarding its decision-making on ministers
would have nowhere to turn, except perhaps to a cloister. Congregations
should not have to withdraw from society in order to have control over
their decisions about the ministers who serve them.
These factors are not legitimate reasons to deny religious
communities the special ability to make decisions about their ministers
free from government oversight and regulation.
CONCLUSION
Our laws properly prohibit the government from discriminating
against religion, but they also rightly recognize that the state should treat
religion differently sometimes. This different treatment of religion
sometimes requires-and at other times, permits-the government to
deny certain benefits to religious institutions and for religious activities.
On the flip side, it also requires-and at other times, permits-the
government to refrain from interfering with religion, including
sometimes allowing religious bodies the latitude to operate without
government oversight in ways that would be unacceptable for
nonreligious bodies.
These two forms of different treatment for religion-denying it
certain government benefits, while also refraining from regulating it at
times-work together to create a healthy separation of church and state;
a separation in which there is freedom of conscience and religious
independence from government. There is a rough symmetry of
231
exemption and limitation here, one I believe advances First Amendment
principles.98
When these principles are respected, religion has the opportunity
to be vital precisely because it is uncoerced, and the lines that divide us
in religious matters do not hinder us from building solidarity in our civic
life. When religion has this kind of independence and autonomy, it is free
to seek its own mission rather than becoming an arm of the state. With
this kind of separation from government, religious messages are not
compromised and muddled by government aims. Religion requires this
distance from the state to be authentic and autonomous.
So, as imperfect as these lines are, I hope the Court will continue
to see the need for the government to treat religion differently at times, to
protect the rights of conscience, and to safeguard the freedom of and for
religion.
98. See Rogers & Dionne, supra note 31, at 39.
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